The Psychology of Voice and Performance Capabilities in Masculine and Feminine Cultures and Contexts

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In this article, we examine the hypothesis that in masculine cultures or in other contexts that emphasize competitive achievement, those with higher performance capabilities will feel empowered to have input in decisions and, hence, will desire opportunities to voice their opinions about decisions to be made. In contrast, in more feminine cultures or in other contexts that value the importance of nurturing people with lower capability, those with lower capabilities will feel valued as important group members, will feel worthy of receiving voice and, hence, will appreciate voice opportunities. We provide evidence for these predictions in 2 studies, 1 conducted in the United States (a more masculine culture) and 1 in the Netherlands (a more feminine culture). Evidence also comes from experimental conditions in both studies, in which we made salient to participants countercultural norms and values, that is, nurturing the less capable in the United States and competitive achievement in the Netherlands. Implications for the psychology of voice and cross-cultural research are discussed.

Keywords: voice, performance capabilities, masculine and feminine cultures, competitive achievement, nurturance

This article focuses on the issue of how people who see themselves as having higher performance capabilities or lower performance capabilities respond to opportunities to voice their opinions about decisions to be made. In particular, we examine the well-established tendency for people to be more satisfied with a decision when they have received, as opposed to have been denied, voice. This instance of *the voice effect* is probably one of the most

This article was published Online First August 16, 2010.

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Kees van den Bos and Joel Brockner contributed equally to this article. The research reported in this article was supported by VICI innovation research Grant 453.03.603 from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research, awarded to Kees van den Bos. We thank Phyllis Siegel for her very helpful comments on earlier versions and Robbert Petterson for his assistance with Study 2.

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generally accepted and best documented findings in the procedural justice literature (e.g., Brockner et al., 1998; Folger, 1977; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Van den Bos, 2005). Given the centrality of voice in procedural justice and in many real-world situations (see, e.g., Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990; Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler, Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985), it is both theoretically and practically important to understand the conditions under which voice is more likely or less likely to influence individuals' reactions to decisions (Van den Bos, 1999). In the present article, we focus on important and heretofore unexamined situational cues and associated culturally based beliefs that may moderate the voice effect and that may contribute to a better understanding of the psychology of voice and performance capabilities.

We develop predictions on how people react toward voice and perceived performance capabilities on the basis of Hofstede's work regarding the differences between "masculine" and "feminine" cultures (e.g., Hofstede, 2001) and on both expectancy-based notions of the psychology of voice (e.g., Brockner et al., 1998; Van den Bos & Spruijt, 2002) and group-value or relational models of procedural justice (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Toward this end, we first briefly introduce the concept of masculine and feminine cultures and contexts. Then, we delineate how these cultures and contexts may moderate people's reactions to voice and no-voice procedures and higher and lower performance capabilities. We combine this with a methodological tool for investigating assumed cross-cultural differences that we would

like to propose here, namely, to assign some participants to experimental conditions in which countercultural norms and values are made salient. To the extent that the results in the countercultural (experimental) conditions meaningfully differ from those observed in the control conditions, we can gain greater insight into the psychological dimensions that account for cross-cultural differences in people's thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Specifically, we examine how people react to voice and no-voice procedures on the basis of their default cultural norms and values in more masculine cultures (i.e., the United States in Study 1) and in more feminine cultures (i.e., the Netherlands in Study 2). We combine this with examining how people react to countercultural norms and values, that is, nurturing the less capable in the United States (Study 1) and competitive achievement in the Netherlands (Study 2).

Masculine and Feminine Cultures and Contexts

Masculinity and femininity refer to a number of psychological variables (for an overview, see Hofstede, 2001). The main components of the masculinity–femininity distinction of relevance here is being achievement-oriented and competitive, in the case of masculinity, and being relationship- and nurturing-oriented, in the case of femininity. That is, we build our line of reasoning on the notion that in masculine cultures, people assign importance to competitive achievement and outperforming their peers (Hofstede, 1998, 2001, 2007). In contrast, feminine cultures emphasize values such as nurturing those who are less capable, to bring about greater equality between the less capable and their more capable counterparts.

Thus, an important component of the masculinity-femininity dimension, we argue, is the extent to which a culture or social context stresses achievement or nurture. Other related concepts also play an important role in how Hofstede (1998, 2001, 2007) defines masculinity and femininity. For example, in his work, masculinity is seen to be the factor that emphasizes ambition, acquisition of wealth, and differentiated gender roles. Femininity is seen to be the factor that stresses caring and nurturing behaviors, sexuality equality, environmental awareness, and more fluid gender roles. As Hofstede (2001, p. 297) put it,

Masculinity stands for a society in which social gender roles are clearly distinct: Men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success; women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life. Femininity stands for a society in which social gender roles overlap: Both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life.

This noted, we focus in this article on the competitive and achievement elements of masculinity, and the relationship-oriented and nurturing elements of femininity.

We also ground our work on the observation that the United States is an example of a more masculine culture, whereas the Netherlands is an example of a more feminine culture. For instance, Vunderink and Hofstede (1998) reported that when American business students studied in the Netherlands they experienced a "femininity shock," due to the tendency of the Dutch culture to place much greater emphasis on values such as nurturing those with lower capabilities (see also Van de Vliert & Janssen, 2002).

Hofstede (2001) also has shown that the masculinity–femininity dimension is independent of dimensions such as individualism–collectivism (Schwartz, 1992). Hofstede (2001) has not been very articulate about the possible relation with power and dominance, but he does treat power distance as a separate cultural dimension from the masculinity–femininity dimension. Furthermore, from research by Vescio and colleagues (e.g., Vescio, Gervais, Snyder, & Hoover, 2005; Vescio, Snyder, & Butz, 2003), we know that powerful positions occupied by men may affect female performance in masculine domains, once the power holder stereotypes his female subordinates. For more extensive introductions to masculine and feminine cultures, we refer to Hofstede (1998, 2001, 2007) and Vunderink and Hofstede (1998).

Voice in Masculine and Feminine Cultures and Contexts

In theory and research in the procedural justice literature, researchers have previously considered possible cultural differences in how people react to voice. Some have argued that voice and procedural justice effects are largely invariant across different cultures (e.g., Lind, Tyler, & Huo, 1997). Others have noted that differences between individualistic and collectivistic cultures or between cultures varying in power distance may moderate voice effects (e.g., Brockner et al., 2001; Leung, 2005). To our knowledge, however, researchers have not explored the possibility of masculine and feminine cultures and associated contexts affecting the voice effect. In the present article, we propose that when studied in combination with differences in performance capabilities, cultural and contextual differences in masculinity and femininity yield important new insights into the psychology of voice.

In studying this issue, we ground our hypotheses on the basis of both expectancy and group-value and relational accounts of voice. The expectancy explanation of the voice effect emphasizes the importance of people feeling entitled or empowered to voice their opinions. Expectancy theory posits that one basis for motivation is the belief that effort will lead to successful performance (Vroom, 1964). For example, people's motivation to have voice depends on the extent to which they believe or expect that their input will have a meaningful impact on the decision process (Van den Bos & Spruijt, 2002). Thus, those who feel they have meaningful things to say about decisions are expected to be more satisfied with opportunities to voice their opinions about these decisions and to be more dissatisfied with denials of such opportunities (e.g., Brockner et al., 1998; Van den Bos & Spruijt, 2002).

Group-value or relational models of procedural justice and voice note that people feel respected and valued as important members of their group when they receive voice and do not experience respect and group value when they are not allowed voice (e.g., Lind et al., 1990; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Thus, group-value and relational frameworks suggest that having input is important to people not only because it may help them to shape decisions but also because it communicates that they are respected and acknowledged as people (e.g., Lind et al., 1990; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Here we note the relevance of both expectancy and group-value accounts on how people react to voice and no-voice procedures in masculine and feminine cultures and associated contexts.

Specifically, we argue that in masculine cultures, which by definition emphasize outperforming others (Hofstede, 1998, 2001, 2007), or in other contexts that value competitive achievement (Vroom, 1964), those who see themselves as having higher performance capabilities will feel more empowered to have input into decisions. Therefore, given expectancy-oriented explanations of the voice effect (e.g., Brockner, 1988; Brockner et al., 1998; Van den Bos & Spruijt, 2002), it is reasonable to assume that in masculine cultures or other contexts that emphasize competitive achievement, people with higher performance capabilities will desire having an opportunity to voice their opinions about decisions that are related to their higher capabilities and will be dissatisfied when they do not get such a voice opportunity (Van den Bos & Spruijt, 2002). We further propose that those with lower performance capabilities will not feel empowered to have input in masculine cultures or other competitive achievement contexts. Therefore, these individuals will not expect or respond in particularly positive terms to opportunities to voice their opinions (Van den Bos & Spruijt, 2002) and will not express strong distaste for the denial of such an opportunity in cultures or contexts in which competitive achievement is emphasized. Thus, we predict that in masculine cultures or in contexts of competitive achievement, those with higher performance capabilities will be more satisfied with opportunities to voice their opinions than with denials of such opportunities, whereas satisfaction of those with lower performance capabilities will be less strongly or not significantly affected by the presence or absence of voice.

We further note that in feminine cultures, which by default emphasize nurturance of those less well off (Vunderink & Hofstede, 1998), or in other contexts that value the importance of nurturing the less capable (Hofstede, 1998, 2001, 2007), those who in fact have lower capabilities will feel valued as important group members. Therefore, given group-value and relational accounts of procedural justice and voice (e.g., Lind et al., 1990; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992), it seems reasonable to propose that in cultures or contexts of nurturing the less capable, people who actually do have lesser capabilities will feel valued and respond positively to getting an opportunity to voice their opinions, whereas these people will feel less valued and will find it discrepant with the surrounding cultural or contextual norms and values when they are denied voice. Furthermore, cultures or contexts that value nurturing the lesser capable convey a norm of modesty (Sedikides, 2009) to those who in fact have higher performance capabilities. That is, in cultures or contexts that value nurturing the lesser capable, those who actually have higher performance capabilities are not supposed to explicitly desire or insist on opportunities to voice their opinions (Fiddick & Cummins, 2007). Therefore, we predict that in feminine cultures or contexts that value the nurturing of the less capable, those with lower performance capabilities will be more satisfied with opportunities to voice their opinions than with withholding of these opportunities, whereas satisfaction of those with higher performance capabilities will be less strongly or not affected by the presence or absence of voice.

Cultural and Countercultural Norms and Values

The experimental paradigm we use in our two studies was developed by Brockner et al. (1998, Study 5). In this paradigm, undergraduates complete an inventory that presumably assesses

their conflict management skills. They are informed that their answers to this inventory reveal that their capability to discuss conflict skills is either much better than that of their peers (higher capability condition) or average (lower capability condition). The degree of voice that participants experience is subsequently manipulated: Some participants are given an opportunity to voice their opinions about being selected for a group discussion on conflict management skills (voice condition), whereas others are not (no-voice condition). All participants are then informed that they will not participate in a group discussion on conflict management skills, after which they are asked how satisfied they are with this decision.

In the present research, we use this paradigm to study differences between masculine and feminine cultures and associated contexts of competitive achievement and nurturing those with less capability. In particular, we posit that cross-national researchers need to pay more attention to explaining (and not merely demonstrating) cross-cultural differences in people's thoughts, feelings, and behaviors (Brockner, 2003). One way to try to account for cross-cultural differences would be to measure the psychological dimensions assumed to account for the cross-cultural effect and to then conduct tests of mediation to evaluate whether the relation between culture and the dependent variable is explained by the psychological dimensions (but see Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005).

The present article suggests another way to explain crosscultural differences. Toward this end, American students from the University of Arizona in the United States participated in Study 1, and Dutch students from Utrecht University in the Netherlands took part in Study 2. Given previous research on cross-cultural differences (e.g., Hofstede, 1998, 2007), the United States participants in Study 1 were expected to assign importance to the masculinity-related value of competitive achievement, whereas the Dutch participants in Study 2 were expected to emphasize the femininity-related value of nurturing those with less capability. One way to evaluate the influence of these assumed cultural differences in masculinity-femininity is to assign participants to conditions designed to elicit countercultural psychological states, that is, conditions that emphasize the femininity value of nurturance in the United States (Study 1) and that emphasize the masculinity value of competitive achievement in the Netherlands (Study 2). To the extent that the results in the countercultural (experimental) conditions meaningfully differ from those observed in the control conditions in which no values are emphasized explicitly, we can gain greater insight into the psychological dimensions that account for cross-cultural differences in people's reactions. Thus, by including such countercultural conditions in the present studies (i.e., the experimental conditions), we are on firmer ground in suggesting that the different results expected to arise in the control conditions in the American sample in Study 1 and in the Dutch sample in Study 2 are attributable to differences in the importance that members of the two cultures assign to the values associated with masculinity and femininity, respectively.

Study 1

Brockner et al. (1998, Study 5) used American undergraduates as research participants and found them to be more satisfied with the decision when they had voice than when they did not, but only when they believed that they were more capable of providing

meaningful input into the decision process and not when they believed they had only average capabilities. This pattern of results is consistent with what our line of reasoning predicts is likely to happen in masculine cultures such as the United States. Study 1 was designed to provide further insight into the relation between people's beliefs about their capability to provide meaningful input into a decision process and their degree of voice.

Study 1 was conducted in the United States with American participants. We manipulated the extent to which our American participants valued the nurturance of people with lower capability. That is, for half the participants, we said nothing about what they should consider important, which is how all participants were treated in Brockner et al. (1998, Study 5). We assumed that in the absence of saying anything to participants about values, they would default to assigning importance to the value commonly held in their culture, in this instance competitive achievement. To the other half of the participants, we communicated that in this experiment it was valued to assign importance to the nurturance of those with lower capability. We reasoned that doing so would make salient the importance of nurturing those with lower capabilities and, hence, would install a more feminine context on the basis of which our participants would react to subsequent voice and novoice procedures.

In addition to the nurturing values manipulation, we also manipulated whether participants had higher or lower performance capabilities with respect to conflict-resolution skills and whether they did or did not receive an opportunity to voice their opinions about why they felt they should be assigned to a group discussion about conflict-resolution skills. In sum, the design of Study 1 was a 2 (nurturing values: salient vs. not salient) \times 2 (capabilities: higher vs. lower) \times 2 (procedure: voice vs. no voice) factorial design.

Building on the line of reasoning laid out earlier, we predicted a three-way interaction effect. That is, when nothing was said about what participants should value, we expected to replicate the previously found results by Brockner et al. (1998), such that our American participants with higher performance capabilities would be more satisfied with opportunities to voice their opinions than with denials of such opportunities, whereas satisfaction of the participants with lower performance capabilities would be less strongly affected or not affected by the presence or absence of voice. In contrast, when the nurturance of those with lower capability was emphasized, we expected that participants who in fact had lower performance capabilities would be more satisfied with opportunities to voice their opinions than with the withholding of these opportunities, whereas satisfaction of participants with higher performance capabilities would be less strongly influenced or not influenced by the presence or absence of voice.

Method

Participants and design. One hundred and ninety-six American students (103 men and 93 women; $M_{\rm age} = 21.63$ years, SD = 2.68) at the University of Arizona in the United States participated in the study, and they were given course credit for their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of the 2 (nurturing values: salient vs. not salient) \times 2 (capabilities: higher vs. lower) \times 2 (procedure: voice vs. no voice) factorial design.

Experimental procedure. Our experimental procedure was similar to that of Brockner et al. (1998, Study 5). Participants were invited to participate in a study on remedying high school conflict. Participants first completed a rather dull 5-min letter-counting task in which they were asked to circle all of the letter Os on pages of text. After this, the experiment was administered via the computers in individual rooms. Participants were informed that the study was being jointly conducted by researchers at a local university and by educators at local high schools to formulate a strategy for dealing with escalating violence in high schools. They were then told that half of them would be selected to participate in a brainstorming task about violence at high schools. Participants' interest in taking part in the brainstorming activity was heightened by informing them that their views as recent high school graduates were particularly necessary to help bridge the generation gap between educators and students. Those who would not be selected to take part in the brainstorming task would spend the remainder of the experiment on the dull letter-counting task. Participants also were informed that the decision about whether they would be admitted to the group discussion activity would be based on a number of selection criteria, including (but not limited to) their performance on a questionnaire entitled the High School Conflict Skills Inventory.

In the condition in which nurturing values were made salient (the experimental condition) participants were told that their performance would not be compared with others who took the inventory and that the researchers were trying to create an environment in which those with lower and higher capabilities would be equally appreciated. Specifically, participants in this condition read the following:

It is important for you to know that we are NOT interested in how well you do on the High School Skills Inventory compared with the other people who participate in this study. We are getting participants with similar levels of conflict skills. Do not worry about your performance compared with others who take this assessment. In fact, we are striving here to install an environment in which all people involved in the study (including those with higher and those with lower conflict management capabilities) would be appreciated. In other words, we are striving for a climate in which those with higher capabilities do not gloat or boast about this but instead pay close attention to the needs and opinions of those with lower conflict management skills and those with lower capabilities.

In the control condition nurturing values were not made salient and participants were only informed that we were measuring how people answered the High School Skills Inventory. Specifically, participants in the control condition read the following: "What we are interested in is how people answer the High School Conflict Skills Inventory. So, we are asking participants to answer the questions of this inventory."

To evaluate whether the values manipulation was induced as intended, participants were asked to answer the question, "To what extent do you agree that giving people with lower capabilities careful consideration is important?" ($1 = to \ a \ small \ extent$, $9 = to \ a \ large \ extent$).

After this, participants completed the High School Conflict Skills Inventory that consisted of 35 items about handling interpersonal conflicts in schools. Participants were informed that this inventory was used to measure their conflict management skills

and their level of proficiency at resolving conflict among high school students. After completing the questionnaire, the computer supposedly scored their answers. In reality, after waiting for 1 min, participants received randomly preprogrammed feedback about how well they did on the High School Conflict Skills Inventory. Participants in the higher capability condition were told that they did very well on the High School Conflict Skills Inventory.

You did very well on the conflict management items you just answered and you scored very high on the High School Conflict Skills Inventory. That is, you scored among the top 5% of all the participants who have participated thus far in our study (which are quite a lot of people). This shows that you know how to deal with conflicts very well. Your capabilities of conflict management, therefore, should be judged very high. Thus, you would definitely be important in discussing how to deal with conflicts.

In contrast, participants in the lower capability condition were told

You did reasonably well on the conflict management items you just answered and you scored as average on the High School Conflict Skills Inventory. That is, your score is a very typical score, close to the average of all the participants who have participated thus far in our study (which are quite a lot of people). This shows that you have average skills on how to deal with conflicts. Your capabilities of conflict management, therefore, should be judged to be average. Thus, you would not be especially important in discussing how to deal with conflicts.

We then checked the capability manipulation by asking participants to what extent they agreed with the statement, "I am highly capable at managing conflict" ($1 = strongly\ disagree$, $9 = strongly\ agree$). The experimenter then supposedly decided whether they would participate in the brainstorming activity. In reality, all participants' computers were programmed to wait for 1 min and then forward them on to the procedure manipulation.

The procedure manipulation was then induced. In the voice condition, the experimenter allegedly asked participants to type in their opinions about why they felt that they should be assigned to the brainstorming activity. (In reality, all stimulus information was preprogrammed.) Participants were being asked to type their opinions while waiting for feedback indicating whether they would participate in the brainstorming task. Participants in the no-voice condition were not given this voice opportunity as they were informed that they would not be asked to provide their opinion about why they felt that they should be assigned to the group discussion. As a check on the procedure manipulation, participants answered the question, "The high school representative allowed me to explain my qualifications for managing conflict among high school students" (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree).

As in Brockner et al. (1998), all participants were then told that the representative had not selected them to take part in the group discussion. We then assessed participants' satisfaction with the high school representative's decision with the following item: "To what extent are you satisfied with the decisions made by the people who conducted this study?" ($1 = very \ dissatisfied$, $9 = very \ satisfied$). After this, participants were thoroughly debriefed.

Results

Manipulation checks. A 2 (nurturing values: salient vs. not salient) \times 2 (capabilities: higher vs. lower) \times 2 (procedure: voice

vs. no voice) analysis of variance on participants' answers to the question regarding the extent to which careful consideration for people with lower capabilities was important to them yielded only a significant main effect of the values manipulation, F(1, 188) = 4.51, p < .04, $\eta^2 = .02$. As intended, this main effect showed that participants found it more important to give people with lower capabilities careful consideration in the condition in which nurturing those with lower capability was salient (M = 6.80, SD = 1.71) than in the condition in which this was not salient (M = 6.24, SD = 1.98).

A 2 (nurturing values) \times 2 (capabilities) \times 2 (procedure) analysis of variance on the item that checked the capability manipulation showed a significant main effect only of the capability manipulation, F(1, 188) = 32.06, p < 001, $\eta^2 = .15$. Participants in the higher capability condition indicated that they were more capable at managing conflict (M = 5.75, SD = 1.69) than were those in the lower capability condition (M = 4.35, SD = 1.76).

A 2 (nurturing values) \times 2 (capabilities) \times 2 (procedure) analysis of variance on the item that checked the procedure manipulation showed only a significant main effect of procedure, F(1, 188) = 66.25, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .26$. Participants in the voice condition felt that they had been given more of an opportunity to explain why they should be elected for the group discussion (M = 6.02, SD = 2.82) than had those in the no-voice condition (M = 3.14, SD = 2.04). In summary, all three manipulations were successfully induced.

Satisfaction. A 2 (nurturing values) \times 2 (capabilities) \times 2 (procedure) analysis of variance on participants' satisfaction ratings yielded a main effect of capability, $F(1, 188) = 3.91, p < .05, \eta^2 = .02$, such that participants were more satisfied in the higher capability condition than in the lower capability condition. The only other significant effect was the predicted three-way interaction effect, $F(1, 188) = 9.61, p < .01, \eta^2 = .05$. To interpret the nature of this effect, we performed a least significant difference test for multiple comparisons between means (p < .05), with the eight cells of our design serving as the independent variable. Table 1 shows the results of this test and the means and standard deviations.

As predicted, when no explicit values were emphasized to our American participants, those who believed they had higher capabilities were more satisfied with the representative's decision when they received an opportunity to voice their opinions than when they did not receive such an opportunity, F(1, 188) = 4.69, p < .04, $\eta^2 = .02$, whereas such a voice effect was not obtained among those participants with lower capabilities, F(1, 188) = 0.05, p > .81, $\eta^2 = .00$. These findings replicate those observed by Brockner et al. (1998). In further accordance with our predictions, when the importance of nurturing people with lower capability was salient, those with lower capabilities were more satisfied when they received voice as opposed to no voice, F(1, 188) = 5.10, p < .03, $\eta^2 = .03$, whereas the voice effect was not significant among those with higher capabilities, F(1, 188) = 2.22, p > .13, $\eta^2 = .01$.

Discussion

The logic underlying Study 1 was that participants in the control condition would default to assigning importance to the predominant values in their culture. According to Hofstede (2001), the United States is a masculine culture, in which people assign

Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations of Satisfaction Among American Participants as a Function of Nurturing Values, Capability, and Procedure: Study 1

	Nurturing values									
	Not salient				Salient					
	Lower capability		Higher capability		Lower capability		Higher capability			
Procedure	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD		
Voice No voice	$4.12_{b,c} $ $4.20_{b,c}$	1.66 1.61	5.21 _a 4.24 _{b,c}	1.18 1.64	5.00 _{a,b} 3.96 _c	1.41 1.77	4.46 _{a,b,c} 5.12 _a	1.73 1.30		

Note. Means with higher values indicate higher levels of satisfaction with the representative's decision (1 = very dissatisfied, 9 = very satisfied). Means with no subscripts in common differ significantly (p < .05), as indicated by a least significant difference test for multiple comparisons between means.

importance to achievement and to outperforming their peers. We therefore assumed that in the absence of saying anything to our American participants about values, they would default to those values commonly held in their culture, that is, competitive achievement. To the other half of our participants, it was communicated that in this experiment it was valued to assign importance to the nurturance of those with lower capability. We proposed that this would make salient the importance of nurturing those with lower capabilities and, hence, would install a more feminine context on the basis of which our participants would react to subsequent voice and no-voice procedures.

The findings obtained in Study 1 are in accordance with what our line of reasoning predicted would happen in masculine cultures and in feminine contexts. That is, when nothing was said to our American participants about what they should value, participants who had been informed that they had higher performance capabilities were more satisfied with opportunities to voice their opinions than with denials of such opportunities, whereas satisfaction of the participants who had been told they had lower performance capabilities were not significantly affected by the presence or absence of voice. In further accordance with our line of reasoning, we also found that when people were encouraged to assign importance to nurturing those with lower capabilities, those who in fact had lower capabilities were more satisfied with opportunities to voice their opinions than with being denied these opportunities, whereas satisfaction of participants with higher performance capabilities were not significantly influenced by the presence or absence of voice.

Study 2

Whereas the results of Study 1 were consistent with our reasoning, further research is needed to evaluate whether the results emerged for the reasons we proposed. One way to do this is by examining participants from a culture that emphasizes more feminine values such as nurturing those who are less capable (Hofstede, 1998, 2001, 2007). Furthermore, participants from the other culture should be assigned to one of two conditions: one in which nothing is said about what they should value (as in the control condition in Study 1) and another in which they are asked to assign importance to countercultural values, namely, the masculinity-oriented values of competitive achievement (the experimental condition). In sum, this would suggest a study conducted within a feminine culture with a 2 (competitive achievement values: salient

vs. not salient) \times 2 (capabilities: higher vs. lower) \times 2 (procedure: voice vs. no voice) factorial design.

If the logic posited to underlie the results of Study 1 is correct then participants in the control condition of a study conducted in a feminine culture should default to the values that are predominant in their culture, in this case the feminine value of nurturance, and should react to voice and performance capabilities accordingly. That is, participants from a culture that values the nurturing of the less capable and who find out that they in fact have lesser capabilities should feel valued when they receive an opportunity to voice their opinions and respond positively to voice whereas they should feel less valued and react more negatively when they are denied voice. Furthermore, those participants from feminine cultures who actually have higher capabilities are not expected to demand voice or show explicit disappointment when not receiving voice (Fiddick & Cummins, 2007). Moreover, in the experimental condition, in which participants from a feminine culture are led to emphasize the countercultural values of achievement and outperforming their peers, we would expect participants to exhibit more masculine reactions to voice and performance capabilities. Thus, if our line of reasoning is correct then participants in this countercultural condition should show a stronger voice effect when having high performance capabilities, as opposed to low performance capabilities.

To test this predicted three-way interaction effect, we conducted Study 2 in the Netherlands, which has been shown to emphasize the feminine value of nurturing the capable (Hofstede, 1998, 2001, 2007). As in Study 1, we manipulated people's perceptions of their capability level as well as whether they were allowed to have voice in the decision. Similar to Study 1, we also manipulated the presence or absence of instructions to assign importance to values contrary to the predominant ones in the culture. In Study 1, the predominant cultural value was assumed to be more masculine and the countercultural (or experimental) condition was one that emphasized femininity. In Study 2, the predominant cultural value was posited to be more feminine, therefore the countercultural (or experimental) condition was one in which the masculine value of competitive achievement was emphasized.

Method

Participants and design. One hundred and ninety-seven Dutch students (48 men and 149 women; $M_{\rm age} = 20.87$ years, SD = 3.10) at Utrecht University in the Netherlands participated in

the experiment and were paid for their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of the 2 (competitive achievement values: salient vs. not salient) \times 2 (capabilities: higher vs. lower) \times 2 (procedure: voice vs. no voice) factorial design.

Experimental procedure. The method of Study 2 was similar to Study 1. The values manipulation was induced at the same point of the experiment as in Study 1. In the experimental condition of Study 2, competitive achievement was made salient. Specifically, building on the work by Harackiewicz and Elliot (1993), participants were told the following:

What we are interested in is how well you do on the High School Conflict Skills Inventory compared with the other people who participate in this study. We are getting participants with different levels of conflict management skills and collecting data on how good their skills are compared with others. So, we will assess how well you do on this inventory, compared with the other participants.

The control condition of the values manipulation was the same as in Study 1. To check whether the competitive achievement values manipulation of Study 2 was experienced as intended, all participants were asked to indicate how strong was their desire to perform well on the High School Conflict Skills Inventory $(1 = very\ weak, 7 = very\ strong)$.

The capability and procedure manipulations were induced and checked in the same way as in Study 1. As in Study 1, all participants were informed that the representative had not selected them to take part in the group discussion. Participants then answered the questions pertaining to the dependent variable and to additional measures.

Satisfaction. One potential shortcoming of Study 1 was that the measure of satisfaction consisted of a single item. To measure satisfaction in Study 2, we used the same two items that were assessed by Brockner et al. (1998, Study 5): "How satisfied are you with the representative's decision?" and "How satisfied are you with the procedure employed by the high school representative to decide which of the students to assign to the group discussion?" ($1 = very \ dissatisfied$, $9 = very \ satisfied$). Participants' responses to these two items were averaged to yield a reliable index ($\alpha = .87$).

Procedural justice judgments. To gain additional insight into the effects of the procedure manipulation and to assess whether the effects we are reporting regarding satisfaction extend to procedural justice judgments, we also asked participants how just $(1 = very \ unjust, 7 = very \ just)$ and justified $(1 = very \ unjustified, 7 = very \ justified)$ they considered the way they were treated to be. Participants' answers to these two items were averaged to form a scale of procedural justice judgments $(\alpha = .92)$. After answering these questions, participants were paid for their participation and were thoroughly debriefed.

Results

Manipulation checks. A 2 (competitive achievement values: salient vs. not salient) \times 2 (capabilities: higher vs. lower) \times 2 (procedure: voice vs. no voice) analysis of variance was conducted on participants' answers regarding the extent to which performing well on the High School Conflict Skills Inventory was important to them. This analysis yielded only a significant main effect of

competitive achievement values, F(1, 189) = 6.79, p < .02, $\eta^2 = .03$. As intended, the desire to achieve was significantly higher in the condition in which competitive achievement was emphasized (M = 5.10, SD = 1.11) than in the control group (M = 4.66, SD = 1.26).

A 2 (competitive achievement values) \times 2 (capabilities) \times 2 (procedure) analysis of variance on the item that checked the capability manipulation showed only a significant main effect of the capability manipulation, F(1, 189) = 80.31, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .30$. Participants in the higher capability condition believed that they were more capable at managing conflict (M = 5.60, SD = 1.21) than were those in the lower capability condition (M = 3.84, SD = 1.52).

A 2 (competitive achievement values) \times 2 (capabilities) \times 2 (procedure) analysis of variance on the procedure manipulation check indicated only a significant main effect of procedure, F(1, 189) = 173.34, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .48$. Participants in the voice condition felt that they had been given more of an opportunity to voice their opinion (M = 7.00, SD = 2.32) than those in the no-voice condition had been given (M = 2.83, SD = 2.08). In summary, all three independent variables were successfully manipulated.

Procedural justice. A 2 (competitive achievement values) \times 2 (capabilities) \times 2 (procedure) analysis of variance on participants' procedural justice judgments showed only a significant main effect of the procedure manipulation, F(1, 189) = 19.50, p < .001, $\eta^2 = .09$. Participants in the voice condition judged the way in which they had been treated to be more just (M = 4.19, SD = 1.37) than did those in the no-voice condition (M = 3.36, SD = 1.23).

Satisfaction. A 2 (competitive achievement values) \times 2 (capabilities) \times 2 (procedure) analysis of variance on participants' satisfaction ratings showed a significant main effect of the procedure manipulation, F(1, 189) = 6.58, p < .02, $\eta^2 = .03$, such that participants were more satisfied in the voice condition than in the no-voice condition. The only other significant result was the predicted three-way interaction effect, F(1, 189) = 5.35, p < .03, $\eta^2 = .03$. Table 2 shows the appropriate means and standard deviations as well as the results of a least significant difference test for multiple comparisons between means (p < .05), with the eight cells of our design serving as the independent variable.

As hypothesized, we found that when no explicit values were made salient to our Dutch participants, those with lower capabilities were significantly more satisfied with the representative's decision when they received voice as opposed to no voice, F(1, 189) = 3.96, p < .05, $\eta^2 = .02$, whereas the effect of voice was not significant among those with higher capabilities, F(1, 189) = 0.10, p > .74, $\eta^2 = .00$. In further correspondence with our predictions, when competitive achievement was made salient, participants with higher capabilities were more satisfied when they received an opportunity to voice their opinion than when they did not receive voice, F(1, 189) = 8.67, p < .01, $\eta^2 = .04$, whereas we did not find such a voice effect among those with lower capabilities, F(1, 189) = 0.38, p > .53, $\eta^2 = .00$.

Discussion

The findings of Study 2 support our line of reasoning for how people react toward voice and performance capabilities in femi-

Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of Satisfaction Among Dutch Participants as a Function of Competitive Achievement Values,
Capability, and Procedure: Study 2

	Competitive achievement values									
		Not	salient	Salient						
Procedure	Lower capability		Higher capability		Lower capability		Higher capability			
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD		
Voice No voice	4.56 _a 3.52 _c	1.62 1.38	4.38 _{a,c} 4.57 _{a,b}	1.92 1.21	$4.38_{a,c} $ $4.06_{b,c}$	1.80 2.06	5.14 _a 3.65 _b	2.30 1.88		

Note. Means with higher values indicate higher levels of satisfaction with the representative's decision (1 = very dissatisfied, 9 = very satisfied). Means with no subscripts in common differ significantly (p < .05), as indicated by a least significant difference test for multiple comparisons between means.

nine cultures and masculine contexts. That is, when no explicit values were communicated to the Dutch participants of Study 2, those who had been informed they had lower performance capabilities were more satisfied with opportunities to voice their opinions than with denials of such opportunities, whereas satisfaction of the participants who had been told they had higher performance capabilities were not significantly affected by the presence or absence of voice. In further support of our line of reasoning, we also found that when the context emphasized achievement, participants who had higher capabilities were more satisfied with opportunities to voice their opinions than with the withholding of these opportunities, whereas the satisfaction of participants with lower performance capabilities was not significantly influenced by higher or lower levels of voice.

General Discussion

Taken together, the results of both studies delineate important conditions under which the voice effect on experienced satisfaction will be more versus less likely to emerge. Our findings suggest that when competitive achievement is emphasized, either because of national culture (as in the control condition of Study 1) or because of a situational cue inducing participants to do so (as in the experimental condition of Study 2), the voice effect is exhibited significantly by those who believe that they are more capable of providing meaningful input and is weaker (in fact, statistically not significant in both our studies) among those with lower capabilities. In contrast, when as a result of national culture (as in the control condition of Study 2) or situational cues (as in the experimental condition of Study 1) emphasis is put on nurturing those with lower capability, the voice effect is significant among participants who in fact have lower capabilities and is weaker (in fact, nonsignificant in both our studies) among those with higher capabilities. Indeed, the three-way interaction predicting this pattern of findings was significant in both studies. Furthermore, the fact that all of the independent variables were experimentally manipulated allows us to draw causal inferences with a high degree of confidence.

Implications

Conceptual implications. The present findings have important implications for the justice literature by helping to reveal when

and why a widely studied element of fair procedures, voice, influences people's satisfaction with decisions. Perhaps most intriguing, our findings suggest that it is entirely possible for the same effect of voice to be accounted for by different underlying factors under different conditions. That is, when the positive effect of voice is displayed by people who believe that they are highly capable of providing meaningful input, the effect may be driven by people's perceptions that their voice matters. On the other hand, when the positive effect of voice is shown by people who have lower capabilities, the effect may be driven by people assigning importance to nurturing those who are less well off. Thus, what may appear to be a very similar result "phenotypically" (i.e., the tendency for people to respond better when they have more voice) may be the result of different underlying mechanisms "genotypically," depending on whether the voice effect is shown to be stronger among those with more capability or with less capability.

In fact, we suggested in this article that both expectancy accounts and group-value and relational models are important for understanding the voice effect. In particular, we argued that in masculine cultures or other contexts of competitive achievement, expectancy accounts of the voice effect may have a special role (see, e.g., Brockner, 1988; Brockner et al., 1998; Van den Bos & Spruijt, 2002). That is, building on expectancy accounts, it is reasonable to assume that in cultures or contexts that value outperforming others, those who in fact are outperforming others will feel empowered or entitled to have input into decisions and, hence, will like and expect to have voice and will not be satisfied with not getting voice. Furthermore, in cultures or contexts that value competitive achievement, those who in fact are not outperforming others or who are only average will not feel authorized to have input into decisions about which they may not have meaningful things to say and, hence, will not expect or demand voice and will be not be very dissatisfied when they do not get voice. This reasoning suggests that in cultures or contexts of competitive achievement, the findings we reported here are consistent with an expectancy value account.

We also proposed that in feminine cultures or in other contexts emphasizing nurturance, group-value and relational models of procedural justice and voice may have a special role (see, e.g., Lind et al., 1990; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). That is, building on group-value and relational models, it seems reasonable to argue that in cultures or contexts that value the nurtur-

ing of those less well off, those who in fact have lower capabilities will feel valued as important group members and, hence, will feel valued and will be satisfied with getting an opportunity to voice their opinions, whereas they will feel less valued and will find it discrepant with the surrounding cultural or contextual norms and values when they are denied voice. Furthermore, cultures or contexts that value nurturing those less capable may convey a norm of modesty (Fiddick & Cummins, 2007; Sedikides, 2009) to those who in fact have higher performance capabilities. Therefore, those who actually have higher performance capabilities are not supposed to explicitly want or insist on opportunities to voice their opinions, and hence, satisfaction with decision making will not be strongly affected as a function of getting or not getting voice. This suggests that in cultures or contexts of nurturance, our findings are consistent with group-value or relational accounts.

By using participants from cultures that differ in a conceptually meaningful way (Hofstede, 2001), by incorporating the concept of countercultural norms in the research design of both studies, and by showing reliable three-way interaction effects on satisfaction in both studies, we provide supportive evidence for the aforementioned line of reasoning. If we are correct then one important implication of the present research findings is that whereas expectancy accounts may be important in feminine cultures and nurturance contexts, they may be even more important in masculine cultures and other contexts that emphasize competitive achievement. This would suggest that when findings supporting expectancy accounts are observed in feminine cultures and nurturance contexts (such as was the case in the Van den Bos & Spruijt, 2002, study in the Netherlands), these effects may be even stronger in masculine cultures and achievement contexts.

Related to this, whereas group-value and relational models may be important in masculine cultures and achievement contexts, these models may be even more important in feminine cultures and other contexts that focus on nurturing those less well off. When findings supporting group-value and relational models are found in masculine cultures and achievement contexts (e.g., Lind et al., 1990), these effects may be even stronger in feminine cultures and nurturance contexts. It is noteworthy that most findings supporting the group-value and relational models have been obtained in the United States (for reviews, see, e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). If the line of reasoning presented here is correct then the findings obtained in that masculine culture may underestimate how strong the effects of these models may be in more neutral or more feminine cultures or contexts.

Thus, findings obtained in the Netherlands, for example, tend to underestimate the effects of expectancy accounts, whereas results collected in the United States, for instance, tend to underestimate the group-value and relational models. Future research is needed to test the implications of this line of reasoning, including more definitive evidence for the mechanisms proposed.

Cross-cultural implications. The results of our studies also provide indications of how reactions to voice may be shaped by national culture. Consider the results in the control conditions in each of the two studies. The control condition of Study 1 replicated Brockner et al. (1998, Study 5), who found in a U.S. sample that the positive effect of voice on satisfaction resulted only among those who believed that they were more capable of providing meaningful input into an upcoming decision. The same findings emerged in the control condition of Study 1, which also was

conducted in the U.S. In sharp contrast, in Study 2, which was conducted in the Netherlands, the results in the control condition showed that the positive effect of voice on satisfaction was stronger among those who were less capable of providing meaningful input into the upcoming discussion. In fact, a 2 (capability) \times 2 (procedure) \times 2 (country) analysis of variance conducted in the control conditions of the two studies revealed a significant three-way interaction effect supporting this line of reasoning, F(1, 188) = 6.62, p < .02, $\eta^2 = .03$.

Whereas these findings need to be interpreted with caution, we suggest that the different interactions between capability and voice in the control conditions in the two studies may be due to crossnational differences along the Hofstede (1998, 2001, 2007) dimension of masculinity-femininity. In discussing this dimension, Hofstede (1998, 2001, 2007) focused heavily on gender differences or on how men and women are treated in different societies, but from his work we could also reliably identify the proposition that in the masculinity-oriented United States, the greater emphasis on competitive achievement may induce those more capable of providing meaningful input to be more motivated to have voice and, hence, to be more affected by the degree of voice they experienced. In the femininity-oriented Netherlands, the greater emphasis on nurturing those less capable may lead the less capable participants to be more motivated to have voice and, hence, to be more influenced by the level of voice they received.

The results in the control conditions in the two studies are consistent with this reasoning, and it is important that the results obtained in the experimental conditions of our studies lend additional support. The experimental condition in Study 1 was intended to heighten the importance of the less capable people having input, in which case those with lower capability were more motivated to have voice. The experimental condition in Study 2 was designed to induce people to assign importance to doing well and, in particular, to performing better than others, in which case it would make sense for the higher capability people to be more motivated to have voice than their counterparts with lower capability. Thus, taken together, the experimental and control conditions of Studies 1 and 2 provide evidence for our line of reasoning about how people with higher and lower capabilities react to voice opportunities and denials of these opportunities.

The findings in the two experimental conditions also suggest that cultural values are not imperialistic in their influence. Participants may be induced to respond differently from how they might naturally behave if they were left to their own culturally based devices (i.e., in the control conditions). Specifically, we found that when the value of caring for those with lower capabilities was emphasized among American participants, voice versus no-voice opportunities were more likely to influence the reactions of those who saw themselves as having lower capabilities rather than higher capabilities. Conversely, when the value of performing better than others was emphasized among Dutch participants, voice versus no-voice opportunities were more likely to influence the reactions of those who saw themselves as having higher rather than lower performance capabilities. Thus, the findings we obtained in the experimental conditions of both our studies suggest that the values of the current contexts in which people find themselves may overwhelm more default cultural beliefs.

The studies presented here also illustrate a methodological procedure that may be used to account for cross-national differences

in people's thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. In most crosscultural studies, researchers select participants from different cultures and assume that the participants differ along certain psychological dimensions, which in turn elicit differences in dependent variables of cognition, emotion, or behavior. As suggested by the present research, one way to evaluate whether certain psychological dimensions account for cross-cultural differences is to assign people from a particular culture to a condition designed to elicit a countercultural psychological state, for example, one that emphasizes femininity values in the United States and one that emphasizes masculinity values in the Netherlands. By including such countercultural conditions in the present studies (i.e., the experimental conditions), we are on firmer ground in suggesting that the different results that emerged in the control conditions in the American sample in Study 1 and in the Dutch sample in Study 2 are attributable to differences in how much members of the two cultures assigned importance to the values associated with masculinity and femininity, respectively.

The present findings also suggest that cultural differences in how much people value competitive achievement versus nurturance are meaningful determinants of their beliefs and behaviors. There has been a tendency in cross-national research to compare samples from the United States and other westernized countries (such as those in Europe) to those from various parts of the East. As Baumeister (2005) put it,

Today, the vast majority of cultural psychologists focus on comparing Eastern and Western cultures because these are the most reliably different. Other differences are likely to be much smaller, with the possible exception of a few small and remote groups. (p. 177)

Similarly, the Hofstede dimensions (Hofstede, 1998, 2001) that have received the lion's share of attention in prior studies have been individualism—collectivism and, to a lesser extent, power distance. The present findings suggest that by taking other cultural dimensions into account, in particular, masculinity—femininity, it may be possible to find meaningful differences between countries that have tended to be lumped together in previous cross-cultural research, such as the United States and the Netherlands.

Limitations

Conceptual concerns. In addition to their strengths, the present studies have a number of shortcomings, thereby suggesting some fruitful avenues for future research. For example, it would be useful to provide further converging evidence that the three-way interaction effects in both studies were due to the mechanisms posited to underlie them. As predicted, manipulation check evidence in Study 1 showed that participants assigned greater importance to lower capability people being given due consideration in the experimental condition than in the control condition, which may be another way of saying that the experimental condition heightened the motivation to have voice of those who saw themselves as less capable (Tyler et al., 1985). Also as expected, manipulation check evidence in Study 2 showed that participants assigned greater importance to performing well in the experimental condition than in the control condition. Nevertheless, it would be desirable to have further evidence that the results emerged for the reasons that we said that they did.

Furthermore, from the work by Hofstede (e.g., Hofstede, 1998, 2001, 2007; Vunderink & Hofstede, 1998), we assumed that in the control conditions of both studies, participants in the Netherlands emphasized values associated with Hofstede's notion of femininity (nurturing the less capable) ,whereas those in the United States assigned more importance to values associated with Hofstede's conception of masculinity (competitive achievement), relative to one another. Whereas the results in the control conditions (and the corresponding countercultural or experimental conditions) are consistent with this possibility, further research is needed to evaluate these assumptions. It also is important for future research to evaluate whether any of the present findings may be accounted for by other underlying mechanisms and other theoretical frameworks.

One noteworthy finding in this respect is coming from the procedural justice judgments obtained in Study 2. The only significant effect to emerge on the procedural justice judgments was the main effect of the procedure manipulation, such that participants saw the procedure as more fair when they had voice than when they did not. There was no evidence of a reliable three-way interaction effect, F(1, 189) = 0.10, p > .75, $\eta^2 = .00$. Thus, the predicted three-way interaction effect is more likely to emerge on experienced satisfaction than on perceived justice. This may have something to do with satisfaction being better able to tap the hot-cognitive effects that explain more variance in reactions to voice than the more cold-cognitive measures of justice judgments (Van den Bos & Lind, 2009). We would applaud future research that examines these implications in greater detail.

Methodological concerns. It could be argued that the results in the experimental condition of Study 1 may have been compromised by demand characteristics. That is, participants in this condition simply may have followed instructions, assigning importance to that to which they had been instructed to assign importance, which was to be more nurturing toward those with lower capability. As a result, those with less capability were more motivated to have voice, and therefore, their level of satisfaction was more positively responsive to receiving voice. Note, however, that similar results emerged in the control condition of Study 2, in which participants from the Netherlands were expected to maintain a similar psychological outlook as were the participants in the experimental condition of Study 1, namely, to be more concerned about nurturing those with lower capability. Moreover, demand characteristics were not present in the control condition of Study 2, in that participants were given no instructions about what was important. Left to their own devices, however, they behaved similarly to the participants in the experimental condition of Study 1. In other words, the results found in the control condition in Study 2 suggest that explicitly instructing people what to focus on (which was done in the experimental condition in Study 1) did not drive our findings.

Finally, a possible concern is that the satisfaction measures consisted of a single item in Study 1 and two items in Study 2. It should however be noted that these items were "face valid." Furthermore, our findings across studies were consistent, suggesting that they are not an artifact of the single-item measure used to assess the dependent variable in Study 1 (see also Wanous, Reichers, & Hudy, 1997). Nevertheless, in the future, researchers should evaluate whether the observed three-way interactions would emerge on multi-item measures of satisfaction and, for that matter, on other attitudinal or behavioral measures that have been shown to be affected by people's perceptions of voice in particular and by

procedural fairness in general, such as their willingness to support the party who was responsible for the decision or their willingness to support the organization or institution in which the decision was rendered (Tyler & Lind, 1992).

Concluding Comments

In conclusion, the results of two studies suggest that differences in culture and situational cues related to the emphasis people place on the masculinity-related value of competitive achievement versus the femininity-related value of nurturing the less capable influence how those with higher capabilities versus lower capabilities react to the presence and absence of voice. We have discussed the implications that the findings presented here have for our understanding of the psychology of voice. Furthermore, we have pointed out the relevance of our findings for those who wish to elucidate justice findings obtained in different cultural settings. We hope that the moderating influence of cultural and situational factors pertaining to value differences in competitive achievement versus nurturing the less capable may contribute to both scientists' and practitioners' insights about the role voice plays in social interactions in different cultures and different contexts.

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Received January 22, 2009
Revision received February 5, 2010
Accepted February 16, 2010